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Campylobacter  contamination  of  chicken  on  sale  in  the  UK  remains  at high  levels  and  has  a  substantial
public  health  impact.  This  has  prompted  the  application  of  many  interventions  in  the  supply  chain,
including  enhanced  biosecurity  measures  on-farm.  Catching  and  thinning  are  acknowledged  as  threats
to the maintenance  of good  biosecurity,  yet  the people  employed  to undertake  this  critical  work  (i.e.
‘catchers’)  are  a rarely  studied  group.
This study  uses  a mixed  methods  approach  to  investigate  catchers’  (n = 53)  understanding  of the
biosecurity  threats  posed  by  the  catching  and  thinning,  and  the barriers  to good  biosecurity  practice.
It  interrogated  the  role  of  training  in both  the awareness  and  practice  of good  biosecurity.  Awareness  of
lapses  in biosecurity  was  assessed  using  a Watch-&-Click  hazard  awareness  survey (n  = 53).  Qualitative
interviews  (n  = 49 catchers,  5  farm  managers)  explored  the  understanding,  experience  and  practice  of
catching and  biosecurity.
All  of  the  catchers  who  took  part  in  the  Watch-&-Click  study  identified  at least  one  of  the  biosecurity
threats  with  40%  detecting  all of the hazards.  Those  who  had  undergone  training  were  significantly  more
likely  to  identify  specific  biosecurity  threats  and have a higher  awareness  score  overall  (48%  compared
to  9%,  p = 0.03).  Crucially,  the individual  and  group  interviews  revealed  the  tensions  between  the  high
levels  of  biosecurity  awareness  evident  from  the  survey  and  the  reality  of  the  routine  practice  of catching
and  thinning.  Time  pressures  and  a lack  of  equipment  rather  than  a lack of  knowledge  appear  a more
fundamental  cause  of  catcher-related  biosecurity  lapses.  Our results  reveal  that catchers  find themselves
in a  ‘catch-22′ situation  in  which  mutually  conflicting  circumstances  prevent  simultaneous  completion  of
3their job  and  compliance  with  biosecurity  standards. Hence,  although  education  about,  and  enforcement
of,  biosecurity  protocols  has  been  recommended,  our findings  suggest  that  further  reforms,  including
changing  the  context  in  which  catching  occurs  by  improving  the equipment  and  other resources  available
to catchers  and  providing  more  time  for biosecurity,  will be essential  for successful  implementation  of
existing  biosecurity  protocols.
Crown  Copyright  © 2017 Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: caroline.millman@manchester.ac.uk (C. Millman).
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3 catch-22 originates from the title of a novel by Joseph Heller (Heller, J., 1961.
atch-22, a novel) in which the main character is presented with conflicting difficult
ircumstances from which there is no escape.
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1. Introduction
Recently published figures on the levels of Campylobacter con-
tamination among chickens on sale in the UK have intensified the
pressure on the poultry industry to tackle the ‘Campylobacter prob-
lem’. The joint UK government and industry target aimed to reduce
the proportion of birds most heavily contaminated with Campy-
lobacter to <10% by 2015 (FSA, 2013b), but the UK Food Standards
Agency (FSA) analysis in 2014-15 (FSA, 2015c) indicated 73% of
whole birds (chickens) were contaminated with Campylobacter,
with 19% contaminated with >1000 cfu/g. A further, year-long sur-
icle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ey has been commissioned by the FSA, showing some limited
mprovements in the most heavily contaminated (15% > 1000 cfu/g)
n the first quarter of the survey (FSA, 2015b) and again in the
econd quarter (11% > 1000 cfu/g) (FSA, 2016).
Industry efforts to reduce levels of Campylobacter have tar-
eted packaging technology (leak proof sealing and cook in the
ag products), labelling (advising consumers not to wash chicken),
actory processing (maximising the standards of hygiene using
xisting equipment or introducing new interventions such as steam
reatment, surface chilling, and double scalding), live transport sys-
ems (improved crate sanitising), feed and farming systems (feed
dditions, heightened standards of biosecurity including the intro-
uction of model farms and trials of no thinning) (FSA, 2015a).
owever, despite the range of initiatives and the many innovations
dentified and/or introduced Campylobacter contamination levels
emain stubbornly high.
A major focus for control has been at the start of the supply chain,
n the belief that interventions here offer the potential for preven-
ion of, or reductions in the extent of, flock colonisation leading
o a reduction in Campylobacter contamination through processing
nd retail. Although biosecurity requirements were included in the
ed Tractor standard (a UK assurance scheme) in 2011, there has
een little, if any, observed impact on Campylobacter contamination
ates. The FSA suggested that “The lack of impact of this change
ight have been because the new requirements of the standard
ere flawed, or because they have not been applied by producers
ith sufficient consistency to be effective” (FSA, 2013a p. 4). As
 result of this improved application of biosecurity-based inter-
entions on the farm continues to be a focus of efforts to limit
ampylobacter in the food chain.
Newell et al. (2011) summarised the literature relating to
iosecurity-based interventions on farms, highlighting “a paucity
f detailed understanding of both the sources of flock infection
nd those measures which might be effective for the prevention
f flock positivity” (Newell et al., 2011pg 8614). They concluded
hat sample design compromised much of the literature with no
lear transmission route identified to target interventions. Addi-
ionally, they determined that sustaining the rigorous application of
iosecurity measures is fraught with difficulty and is only possible
n conjunction with farm worker education and incentives. More
ecent work with so called ‘model farms’ (JWG, 2014) suggests on-
arm biosecurity can be effective, as not all sheds became positive
ith Campylobacter on farms with good between-shed biosecurity,
nd that fewer sheds became positive on farms using the higher
iosecurity standards.
One widely reported Campylobacter risk factor for broiler flocks
s the process of thinning and subsequent house clearance (Allen
t al., 2008; Newell et al., 2011; Ridley et al., 2011; Koolman et al.,
014; Smith et al., 2016). Whilst it is not yet clear if this relation-
hip results from the effects of associated stress and bird age, or the
reach in biosecurity that occurs because of thinning, the catch-
ng personnel, their biosecurity practices and the equipment that
hey use have come under increasing scrutiny and audit. For exam-
le, the Red Tractor standard was recently revised (October 2014)
o include more requirements for catchers regarding biosecurity
nd the need for specific biosecurity training of catching person-
el. Such training is conducted and recorded under the auspices of
he Poultry Passport scheme (established 2008).
This paper investigates catchers’ understanding and experi-
nce of key biosecurity threats posed by (poor conduct of) the
atching/thinning process, and whether differences in awareness
iffer over observable characteristics of the catchers. It investigates
he barriers to good biosecurity practice in the catching process,
nd interrogates the role of training in both the awareness and
self-reported) practice of good biosecurity procedures on farm.
hese research questions are investigated through a mixed meth-ry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32 23
ods approach. The ability of catchers and catching team managers to
identify biosecurity hazards was  examined using a Watch-&-Click
Hazard Awareness survey. Qualitative individual and group inter-
views were conducted with participants from these groups as well
as a small number of farmers in order to assess their understanding,
experience and practice of catching and of biosecurity.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Watch-&-Click hazard awareness survey
2.1.1. Questionnaire design
A Watch-&-Click survey was conducted with catchers and team
leaders, comprising of a section of interactive video and additional
questions. This real-time test was used in an earlier study relating
to domestic food hazard awareness (Millman et al., 2015). Using
this method, a film is embedded in a web-based interface to allow
respondents to identify hazards, by clicking or tapping a tablet
whenever a hazard was perceived to be evident on the screen –
this response occurs in real-time as the film plays. These clicks are
then turned into click response data (total number of hazards, cor-
rect and incorrect hazards identified) for interrogation alongside
additional questions.
In this study, the film footage showed catchers carrying out
thinning on a broiler farm with 7 deliberate mistakes, hazards
or lapses in biosecurity (Table 1). Additional data (or character-
istics) on demographics and experience was  also collected from
each respondent e.g. biosecurity training, employment status (self-
employed/company employed) and (travelling) distance to the first
farm of the day. Individual feedback was automatically generated
for the respondents completing the survey, to show the hazards
that they identified correctly and those missed, highlighting the
importance of the biosecurity protocols.
2.1.2. Recruitment
Catchers and catching team managers were recruited from
across the poultry catching industry in England to take part in the
Watch-&-Click survey. Snowball sampling was  used to reach differ-
ent sectors of the industry, by sending emails to individuals across
the poultry industry, via individual poultry companies, retailers, the
National Farmers Union (NFU), British Poultry Council (BPC), Red
Tractor and veterinary practices. However due to the low catcher
response rate, five broiler farms were also visited (during catch-
ing) and catchers asked to complete the survey during break times.
The broiler farms were located across three geographical areas (East
Anglia, Lincolnshire, Midlands) and chosen in order to access catch-
ing crews and farmers from different companies. Catching crews
travelled to farms from the North of England, Lincolnshire, East
Anglia, Midlands and South West England.
2.1.3. Data analysis
This survey approach was used to investigate i) how many biose-
curity lapses individuals would identify – Hazard identification
score, ii) which lapses would be more/less likely to be identified −
identification of individual hazards and iii) variation in biosecurity
awareness.
To investigate any variation in awareness, the impact of charac-
teristics on the aggregate identification scores was  assessed using
a right censored Poisson model (Hilbe and Judson, 1999), with the
distribution model capped at 7 hazards. Multiple correspondence
analysis (MCA) and Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) (Husson
et al., 2011) were applied in order to summarise the relationships
between the seven hazards, in terms of their identification by study
participants. Two additional supplementary qualitative variables
(“company” and “no training”) and one quantitative variable (“total
score”) were included. The effect of training on total score and the
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Table 1
Biosecurity hazards and their identification by catchers (n = 53), including comparison of responses for those with and without (self-reported) biosecurity training. The
number in each cell is the percent of respondents that correctly identified each hazard.
Hazards Hazard identification (%)
Description Short name Still from film Overall
n = 53
With Training
n = 42
No training
n = 11
PR Testa p
value
The catching crew wear clothes
from another farm
clothes 70 76 45 0.048*
The  catching forklift is not
sanitised before going onto
farm
Forklift 75 83 45 0.009**
Dirty  clothing and boots are
put on from the back of the
catching van
Dirty clothes 72 71 73 0.932
Boots  are not dipped on entry
to the shedb
Dip 96 100 82 0.005**
The  modules/transport crates
are dirty
Crates 87 93 64 0.011*
The  forklift is not sanitised
before entering another shed
Between sheds 77 83 54 0.042*
The  catching crew sit in their
van for their break
Break 93 95 82 0.134
iosecu
urity –
i
a
v
i
u
l
2
2
fi
s
wa PR Test = Test of proportions between those with and without (self-reported) b
b The boot dip was not situated at the entry to the shed as required for biosec
ndividuals not using this boot dip.
ssociation between MCA  dimensions and identification of indi-
idual hazards was assessed using the v-test, with a v-test > |2|
ndicative of a statistically significant effect. MCA  and HCA were
ndertaken using R v3.2.2 (R Core Team, 2015) and the FactormineR
ibrary.
.2. Group and individual interviews
.2.1. Interview selection
Nine group interviews were conducted with catching teams on
ve broiler farms to explore themes of biosecurity from the per-
pective of catching. Individual interviews were also conducted
ith five farm managers and four catching crew team leaders. Therity training* < 0.05; ** < 0.01.
 the location along a wall is also not permitting proper use. The hazard showed
discussions took place during breaks or when crews were not under
time pressures that may  affect their responses.
2.2.2. Interview design and analysis
A single interviewer undertook all interviews, and a topic guide
was used to assist the interviewer in ensuring that key areas
were covered. Topic areas included: training and level of experi-
ence; definitions and importance of biosecurity; training; catcher’s
role in farm biosecurity; difficulties practicing biosecurity; ways
biosecurity practices could be made easier; perceptions of biose-
curity standards for individual and farmers; and, supervision of
catching and biosecurity on farms. However, in keeping with qual-
itative research methods, the order in which these areas were
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All of the participants were men, with ages ranging from 18 years
to mid-sixties.
Within the interviews the members of the catching teamsC. Millman et al. / Preventive Ve
iscussed was determined by the participant(s) of each interview
nd additional relevant topics were pursued, with the aim that the
articipants could discuss these issues from their own perspectives
nd in their own words. All interviews and focus groups were audio-
ecorded, transcribed and anonymised. Thematic analysis (Braun
nd Clarke, 2006) was used to assess the transcripts to highlight
inor and major themes. This commenced with line-by-line cod-
ng of transcripts. Subsequently, codes were reviewed in order to
dentify overarching themes.
Approval for the two  elements of the study was provided by The
niversity of Liverpool (VREC249) and The University of Manch-
ster (14244) Research Ethics Committees. Signed consent was
btained from individuals participating prior to taking part in the
nterviews and focus groups, at which point the opportunity to opt
ut of being recorded was presented.
. Results
.1. Watch-&-Click survey
.1.1. Study population
Fifty-three catchers and catching team managers were recruited
o take part in the Watch-&-Click survey. Ninety percent were
ritish nationals, with a mean age of 38 years. Eleven percent of
he sample had worked as a catcher for <1 year, 27% for 1–5 years
nd 62% for 5–10 years.
With regard to training, 79% (n = 42) reported that they had
eceived some form of biosecurity training (either informal or for-
al  in format), with 21% (n = 11) reported receiving none. Of the
eople who could remember when the training occurred, 87% said
t was over 3 months ago and 73% said it specifically mentioned
ampylobacter. Poultry passports have been in use within the indus-
ry since 2008 to provide a consistent level of training as well as
 means of recording this for those working in the poultry sector.
lthough not mandatory, the training recorded within the passport
s a requirement of the Red Tractor Scheme; 13% of individuals said
hat they held a poultry training passport, 38% were unsure what
t was or if they had one and 49% stated that they did not hold one.
.1.2. Watch-&-Click responses
.1.2.1. Hazard identification scores. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of
he hazard identification scores overall, and for people who  stated
hat they had had biosecurity training and those without train-
ng. All participants identified at least one of the hazards, with 40%
f the respondents detecting all of the hazards. Significantly more
f those who had received training, 48%, could identify all 7 haz-
rds, compared to only 9% of those without training (Fisher’s exact
est p = 0.03). The mean score for respondents with training, com-
ared with no training, was 6.02 (sd = 1.32) and 4.45 (sd = 1.75),
espectively.
.1.2.2. Identification of individual hazards. All hazards were iden-
ified by at least 70% of respondents (Table 1). The most commonly
dentified hazards were the catchers not using the foot dip (Dip,
6%), debris on the modules/crates (Crates, 87%) and the catch-
rs taking their break in their crew van (Break, 93%). The least
ommonly spotted hazards were clothes being worn from another
arm (Clothes, 70%), dirty clothes being put on from the back of the
rew van (Dirty clothes, 72%), the forklift going straight onto the
arm without cleaning (Forklift, 75%) and the forklift going between
heds without any cleaning or sanitisation (Between sheds, 77%)..1.2.3. Explaining variation in hazard awareness. Further analysing
he individual hazards (Table 1), the proportion of respondents that
dentified the ‘Forklift’ and ‘Dip’ hazards was significantly different
t p < 0.01 (Forklift, p = 0.009; Dip, p = 0.005) between individualsry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32 25
that had been trained and those that had not, whilst ‘Clothes’,
‘Crates’ and ‘Between sheds’ were significantly different at p < 0.05
(Clothes, p = 0.048; Crates, p = 0.011; Between sheds, p = 0.042).
Estimation of the right censored Poisson count model permit-
ted the investigation of the impact of respondent characteristics
(biosecurity training, age, employment status, length of service) on
individuals’ hazard identification scores.4 Using the Poisson model,
only training was found to have a significant association, with an
individual with no biosecurity training likely to identify, on aver-
age, 2.4 fewer hazards than a person who  had received biosecurity
training (p = 0.03).
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was used to explore
the co-identification of hazards and to relate this to respondent
training. The first 3 dimensions identified using MCA  accounted
for approximately 71% of the variance in the data (36.6%, 17.0%
and 16.6%, respectively). Dimension 1 was significantly associated
(|v test| > 2) with all hazards (Table 2; Fig. 2), but was  particu-
larly influenced by individuals’ responses to ‘Forklift’, ‘Crates’ and
‘Break’. Dimension 1 accounted for almost all variation in the total
hazard identification score (Fig. 2). Dimension 2 was significantly
associated with identification of ‘Dip’, ‘Between sheds’ and ‘Dirty
clothes’, while dimension 3 was  significantly associated with ‘Dip’,
‘Dirty clothes’ and ‘Clothes’. Training was significantly associated
with dimension 1 (Table 2, v test = −3.1), but not dimension 2 (v
test = 0.008) or dimension 3 (v test = 0.05). Company was not asso-
ciated with any dimension.
Hierarchical cluster analysis was  used to identify clusters
of respondents with similar hazard identification profiles; this
approach suggested 3 main clusters (Table 2). Among individu-
als in cluster 1, 94% (33/35) had received training (78% of people
that had received training were in cluster 1). Cluster 1 members
also correctly identified all or most (>90%) of the following haz-
ards: ‘Between sheds’, ‘Break’, ‘Forklift’, ‘Crates’ and ‘Dip’; and 83%
identified ‘Clothes’. All members of cluster 2 correctly identified
‘Dirty clothes’ ‘Break’ and ‘Dip’, and 70% and 80% identified ‘Forklift’
and ‘Crates’, respectively, but none identified ‘Between sheds’ and
this cluster included 83% of people who  failed to identify ‘Between
sheds’. Forty percent (4/10) of cluster 2 members received training.
Two-thirds (5/8, 67%) of cluster 3 received no training, accounting
for 45% of people who  received no training. All members of this
group failed to identify ‘Forklift’ (accounting for 61% of all people
who did not identify ‘Forklift’). Half (50%) and a quarter (25%) of
cluster 3 failed to identify ‘Break’ and ‘Dip’, respectively, account-
ing for all people who did not identify these hazards. Three-quarters
did not identify ‘Dirty clothes’. Approximately two-thirds of mem-
bers of clusters 1 and 3 (21/35 and 5/8) worked for an integrated
poultry company, compared to only 30% (3/10) for cluster 2.
Total score varied significantly between the categories, with the
mean score in cluster 1 (6.5) being significantly higher (v-test = 5.2)
and the mean score in cluster 3 (3.1) being significantly lower (v-
test = −5.1) than the overall mean (5.7).
3.2. Interviews
Nine group interviews were conducted on five broiler farms.
Each group interview included between four and six catchers. Indi-
vidual interviews were also conducted with five farm managers and
four catching crew team leaders (total number of participants = 54).highlight a distinction between the informal on-the-job training
4 Results available from authors on request.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of total hazard identification scores among 53 catchers, and among those who  stated that they had previously received biosecurity training (‘With
training’, n = 42) and those reporting never having received training (‘No training’, n = 11). Total score represents the number of hazards identified by each respondent, out
of  a maximum of 7. The numbers above each bar indicate the number of individuals within that category.
Table 2
Results of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Hierarchical Clusters Analysis (HCA) of biosecurity hazard identification by catchers (n = 53). The greater the contri-
bution of a hazard to a dimension the greater its influence on this dimension. The significance of each hazard to each dimension is indicated by the v test, with |v test| > 2
indicative of a significant association (highlighted in bold). The percent of catchers correctly identifying each hazard is provided for each of the three main cluster groups
suggested by Hierarchical Cluster Analysis.
Dimensions identified
using MCA
Percent correct identification of
hazards within the main clusters
identified using HCA
Description Short name Identified hazard? 1 2 3 1 2 3
Cont.a v test Cont. v test Cont. v test n = 35 n = 10 n = 8
The catching crew wear clothes
from another farm
Clothes False 8.1 4.0 4.2 −1.9 5.4 −2.2 83 50 38
True 3.5 1.8 2.3
The  catching forklift is not
sanitised before going onto
farm
Forklift False 20.1 6.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 −0.1 94 70 0
True 6.5 0.3 0.0
Dirty clothing and boots are
put on from the back of the
catching van
Dirty clothes False 3.8 2.7 9.7 2.9 36.3 −5.5 74 100 25
True 1.5 3.8 14.3
Boots are not dipped on entry
to the shed
Dip False 5.9 2.9 16.2 3.2 37.5 4.9 100 100 75
True 0.2 0.6 1.5
The  modules/transport crates
are dirty
Crates False 20.8 5.7 2.1 −1.2 0.9 0.8 97 80 50
True 3.2 0.3 0.1
The  forklift is not sanitised
before entering another shed
Between sheds False 4.1 2.7 43.3 −5.9 0.6 0.7 100 0 75
True 1.2 12.7 0.2
The  catching crew sit in their
van for their break
Break False 19.3 5.4 3.8 1.6 0.8 0.7 100 100 50
True 1.6 0.3 0.1
(
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pa Cont. = Contribution.
that is seen by many to be the mainstay of successfully becom-
ng a catcher) and formal ‘company’ training. Our analysis also
eveals the ways in which concepts of biosecurity (whether gained
hrough formal or informal means) become enacted in the day-to-
ay reality of catching. Hence, even where biosecurity practices
ere widely known (as was evident for many practices in the
atch-&-Click study) our analysis highlights the practical, real-
orld dimensions that require catchers to modify protocols and
rocedures in order to meet the demands of their job and that
rovide rationales for such modifications.Catching was almost universally reported to be very ‘physical
ork’, described as being “one of the hardest jobs in Britain” or “the
ardest physical job you’ll ever do” and is a job that is “not for old
eople”. Working in teams, usually of around 4–6 people, catch-ers collect 5000 to 6000 birds per hour, placing them in crates or
‘modules’, and moving the modules on to trucks for transportation
to the factory. On top of the hard physical work, catching is often
conducted under very difficult conditions. In summer the temper-
ature in the sheds was  reported to reach 30 ◦C and was  described
as “unbelievable” or “ridiculous”, and that high concentrations of
ammonia can make breathing difficult. These conditions increased
the desire to get the job done quickly, and affected the suitability
of some biosecurity procedures. For example, standard protective
clothing was  seen as unsuitable for working in hot conditions. Other
issues with clothing were also noted. For example, trousers were
sometimes worn outside the boots, in order to prevent litter from
entering the boots, but this then caused problems at the boot dips.
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Fig. 2. Representation of the 7 biosecurity hazards (red) on a plane defined by the two  main dimensions identified using Multiple Correspondence Analysis. The axis values
are  the square of the correlation coefficients between the hazard and the dimension and hence are a measure of the quality of the projection of the hazard on the dimension.
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ontinuous variables), total biosecurity score (‘total’) is strongly explained by dime
imension. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the 
imilarly, boots with good tread were viewed as important for
ealth and safety, but made boot disinfection difficult.
.3. Training
Catchers distinguished between formal training, consisting of
alks, videos, manuals and other reading materials, and informal,
n-the-job training. Individual catcher’s experience of training var-
ed greatly. To some extent this was put down to when people
tarted in the industry; those who had been working as catchers for
any years often reported only learning their skills and knowledge
rom their teammates and from their own experience, whereas
eople who had more recently joined catching teams were more
ikely to have reported receiving formal training.
Interviewer: Did they give you training on biosecurity?
Catcher 1: [. . .]  They give you the theory. They give you paper-
work and things like that. [. . .]
Interviewer: Did you see a video on that as well?
Catcher 1: Not on my  time, no. [. . .]
Catcher 2: I think, yes. I had a video and the paperwork.
Catcher 1: Yes. That’s the thing. They just joined the company a
year or two ago and they saw the video. Where people who have
been here for 7 or 10 years, there are people have been here 15
years, they never had a video.
However, this distinction in training, between new-hands and
xperienced catchers, was often not always clear and variation
ppeared also to be associated with the support provided to theAmong the supplementary variables (blue indicates categorical variables and green
s 1 and training (‘No training’) less so, while ‘company’ is not influenced by either
 is referred to the web version of this article.)
team, with some teams readily able to access training, whereas for
others training was absent or very limited:
Catcher: the company runs courses all of the time. So we  tend to
do – I mean we’ve only had one recently with regards Campy-
lobacter. Over the years we’ve done many with regards to
biosecurity.
− − −
Catcher 1: I’ve been here nine months now, and I’ve never done
nothing. I was told, “Go in that shed, catch them chickens, and
that’s your job.” That’s it.
Catcher 2: Basically in this job you learn yourself.
The catchers often questioned the value of training, raising
issues related both to the skills of the trainers and the value of
formal training itself. Often, catchers believed that the trainers
lacked the knowledge and experience that they had already gained
through the time they had served as catchers:
Catcher: the guy at the front knows less about it than what you
do. (Laughter) It gets a bit – and that’s not me being arrogant.
That’s just a fact.
− − −
Catcher: As I say, and some of the courses are taken by ex-
professionals, who are like people who have like worked on a
farm, but a lot of them are just taught by teachers. There’s noth-
ing wrong with that, but they don’t have the same knowledge
that we do, or understanding sometimes of the practicalities
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Furthermore, catching and biosecurity were viewed as practical
ctivities that could not adequately be taught through classroom-
ased approaches that focussed on ‘theory’:
Catcher: It’s a manual job so the only way to learn is to do it.
You can watch as many videos as you want but you’ll not do it.
This distinction between the need for practical training with the
rovision of classroom-based courses, perhaps combined with a
erceived lack of experience of the teachers, caused some catch-
rs to view the training as something of a box-ticking exercise,
hich satisfied the needs of the company, but which did not equip
atchers with the skills needed to undertake biosecurity procedures
ithin the practical realities of their work as catchers.
Catcher: They show you, you’re not trained. They just go, “Here,
sign that, sign that, sign that.”
With or without formal classroom-based training, learning
bout catching and about biosecurity practices was almost univer-
ally seen as an on-going process mediated through practice and
n-the-job learning – one that is both linked to individual experi-
nce and to intra-team relationships. This idea is well-expressed in
he following quotation where catching is compared to learning to
rive a car and in which learning theory is simply a step towards
eing able to undertake the essential practical training obtained
hrough experience and repetition.
Catcher 1: The lad that has been there longer – obviously you
just learn off them.
Interviewer: So usually that’s the way they do it – anybody new
– they just go with the experienced one and there in the job.
Catcher 1: Yes. It’s the best way. Rather than watching a video.
Catcher 2: Yes. You’re better off learning off your own  experi-
ence.
Catcher 1: It’s like doing your driving isn’t it? Once you’ve passed
your test then you learn to drive.
For team leaders, biosecurity training must be tailored to the
eeds of individuals, with considerable effort required to ‘force’
ome members of the catching team to follow procedures, whereas
or others it has become part of their working practice.
Team Leader: some of the guys are brilliant. They’re absolutely
spot-on. They’re on it; they know exactly what they’re doing,
and they know what they need to do. Others, it’s just like you’re
pushing uphill all the time. It’s just an uphill struggle, but they
do it in the end [. . .]  they do it under – not under pressure, but
it’s really banging it home all the time. We’ll spend time with
them; that’s what we’ll do. We’ll be out here on the job all the
time, if it needs that, but generally, they are quite good, to be
fair. They are quite good
This diversity in biosecurity practice within the catching team
s at odds with the perception of many catchers, highlighted above,
hat biosecurity training is best obtained through observation and
earning within the team. This team-based approach would suggest
hat the practices of team-members converge, over time, toward
 standardised practice. However, the statement from the team
upervisor highlights great diversity among team members and the
ork required to make some people follow protocols. In reality,
earning from, and providing training to, members within a team is
ikely to be a feature of the within-team relationships that were
requently reported to be a key feature of a successful catching
eam.
Catcher: You’ve got to be a team. It’s no good having 5 men, 10
men, 12 men  – if you’re not a team, it doesn’t work properly.ry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32
− − −
Catcher: 1: Yes some teams – like us lot – we  all get on well
together like I say, you know, you’ve got to work together, and
if you don’t work together you might as well forget about it. [. . .]
You’ve got to get on well with everybody. [. . .]
These relationships may, therefore, facilitate within-team train-
ing through informal discussion and observation, but are unlikely to
be able to enforce adherence to a specific set of practices or protocol.
3.4. Protocol and practice
While catchers may  claim to understand the concept and prac-
tices of biosecurity, and the related rules and procedures that are
set out by the company and/or individual farms they are working
on, they were also aware of the shortcomings of such procedures
and the impacts of these on disease control.
These shortcomings arise through the process of biosecurity
practice, equipment, the physical nature of catching and the envi-
ronment in which it is performed, and issues of time (and other
factors, undetected in our analyses, may  also be at play). These con-
cerns interact with each other, and coalesce with notions of what
it means to be a ‘good catcher’, forcing reinterpretation and refor-
mulation of standardised protocols for biosecurity taught through
formal training, replacing these with locally derived (and neces-
sary) on-the-job training that is responsive to the physical and
organisational realities of the job.
Indeed, the process of thinning itself, as well as the number of
times that it could take place within one flock, was  viewed by many
as contradictory to the goal of biosecurity procedures. The physical
hygiene barrier system, in the form of the chicken shed, was broken
as soon as the shed doors were opened and in some cases this breach
could be repeated a number of times.
Catcher: We did it [thinning] last night and that’s the third stint
in that shed [. . .]  They have been taken off the feed three times,
for three thinnings.
Furthermore, the practice of biosecurity was inconsistently
applied to the act of entering a shed; whilst catchers were asked to
dip their boots in disinfectant solution on entry to the shed, the
wheels of the forklift truck typically were not cleaned between
when moving in and out of the shed (taking modules off and onto
the live transporter).
A key issue, frequently raised by catchers, was  the impact of
biosecurity equipment (or, its absence) on their ability to enact
biosecurity procedures. The experience of our participants varied
greatly, with some reporting that only around half of farms had
adequate cleaning equipment, and others suggesting that facili-
ties were generally poorer on privately-owned farm, compared to
company-owned farms. Inadequate facilities for washing, was a
recurrent theme discussed by catchers. In some cases water for
washing was not provided on a farm, or was only available through
a single, perhaps inappropriately located hose with insufficient
water pressure to clean boots, the forklift truck or other equipment.
Catcher: The hosepipe outside, that’s all they’ve got for washing
the forklift with before they go somewhere else or take it back
to the yard. [. . .]  That’s the only way  they have of washing the
forklift
Furthermore, this lack of adequate cleaning equipment could be
compounded by a lack of other facilities, such as lighting.
Catcher 1: We  finish around midnight every day, which is pitch
black and some places don’t even have illumination or very poor
illumination.
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Catcher 2: Outside of the sheds.
Interviewer: So it’s difficult for you to clean?
Catcher 1: It’s difficult to clean. You don’t see anything.
Many catchers see provision of inadequate biosecurity equip-
ent and facilities as an area of dispute with farmers and/or the
ompany, as this equipment is necessary for them to perform their
ole as catchers;
Catcher: It should be there anyway. We  shouldn’t be having to
ask for it. It should be already done.
Farmers also reported frustration because they “. . ..tried lots of
hings but nothing makes a difference.  . ..” leading to suggestions
hat there was little to be gained through rigid implementation of
iosecurity procedures (as one farmer put it: “what’s the point?!”).
ndeed, the changes to biosecurity practices over the years were
ometimes seen as having no real impact in practice.
Farmer: My  sheds aren’t any better than last year when I wore
the same boots, or 10 years ago where you didn’t even have
wellies. . ..There’s no worse disease now than there was  then.
I don’t see any difference at all. I mean when I started it was
leather boots, then we went onto wellies, then you went to shed-
specific wellies. Then you went to a barrier system. I’ve double
dipped. I’ve triple dipped. I’ve worn over boots and it’s never
made a second’s worth of difference.  . .
Time was a recurrent theme raised by catchers during discus-
ions. The working day for catchers is often very long and their
ork is undertaken under near constant pressure to meet dead-
ines imposed by the factory. Typically, catchers will be picked up
t home to travel, often for several hours, to a farm to commence
atching. Among the catchers completing the Watch & Click survey,
4% reported that they travelled more than an hour to the first farm
f that day, with 41% reporting over 90 min; only 16% reported that
hey travelled an hour or less. Once finished on that farm, the team
ay  move on to one or two more farms in a single shift.
Catcher: Sometimes you can do 15 h in a day. You come back
and you have ten hours off. You literally get home, shower, eat,
sleep, wake up and get back to work, no social life.
The intersection between time pressures and the implemen-
ation of biosecurity practice was clearly evident in discussions.
atchers have a very specific period of time in which they must con-
uct the catch, and biosecurity procedures must be built into this
ime. Early completion of the task enables some extra downtime
or the team, providing added strong incentive to work quickly.
he time provided may  not vary with the physical reality of the
atch, such that the need for additional biosecurity requirements
ay  not be built into the time available.
Catcher: Look at [name] now. Has he really got time to go and
wash his forklift off? [. . .]  To put four mods in, to wash it off,
to go and get the mods out– because they don’t get any extra
time. If you’re on two sheds you get the same amount of time so
they’ve got to get those 10 stacks done. I mean to do it properly,
he’d have to disinfect that now to put his stacks in, to disinfect
again to go and get the full ones out of shed one, to disinfect
again to put the ones into shed two. It’s not going to happen.
10 min  of time? You’re not going to put 40 min  and unload the
chicken. They don’t get an extra second to do it. . .
The catchers are also aware of the contradictions in biosecurity
rotocols and the reality of planning, citing examples of breaches
n biosecurity in the order in which they visit farms (i.e. visiting a
arm to conduct thinning after visiting one undergoing a full depop-ry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32 29
ulation) and the complexities of multiple activities taking place on
a farm at any one time.
Catcher: You’ve got people cleaning, us catching, you’ve got
people on the site to wash [. . .]  What’s that all about?
The effects of time on the practice of biosecurity may  be fur-
ther influenced by inadequate equipment. The time available for
cleaning was seen to be predicated on having suitable equipment
to hand: the lack of such equipment required either extra work
time, or only partial fulfilment of a biosecurity procedure.
Catcher: They give you 15 min  between each shed.
Interviewer: Is that enough? I heard it takes about 40 min  at
least to clean up the forklift.
Catcher: To do it properly, yes but if you have really decent
power, then you can do it at a faster pace.
− − −
Catcher 1: . . . sometimes you can be there 40–45 min  washing
the forklift because it’s crap.
Catcher 2: Sometimes the hose hasn’t even got a nozzle at the
end, you’ve got to put your thumb over it to get any power.
− − −
The long workday also effects catchers’ ability and/or willing-
ness to engage with training material.
Interviewer: Okay. What about . . . reading . . . materials, or a
handbook or a manual – those sorts?
Catcher: You’ve also got to think – we travel to work . . . It takes
us two hours to get down here, and two  hours to get back home,
so that’s four hours . . . So it’s a long day.
Both the catchers and farm managers were quick to express
the view that others in the chain were responsible for lapses in
biosecurity. Farmers indicated that catching teams were at fault
for breaking biosecurity:
Manager: they know on some farms they can get away with
something and on other farms they can’t.
Catchers felt that the farm managers did not do enough to man-
age litter quality or make sure that they had the resources that they
needed to carry out their job, whilst it was them, the catchers that
took the blame for biosecurity issues.
Catcher: Not everybody follows the biosecurity procedures. We
have to because people are watching us all the time because
they’re always trying to blame this part of the industry. . .
Examples of breaches in biosecurity were readily offered by both
farmers and catchers – these included the movement of bales into
sheds, lack of overalls/changes for different farms, access for fitters
and the lack of desire to want to change wellingtons at the hygiene
barrier in the wet and winter. One participant stated that in their
opinion farmers “stick to the rules 90% of the time”.
4. Discussion
The mixed methods approach used in this study provided an
opportunity for the catchers and farmers to give some insight into
their experiences, perceptions and understanding of biosecurity.
At the same time, the use of the Watch-&-Click survey enabled
data to be gathered from individuals on their awareness of specific
biosecurity protocols.
Almost four-fifths of the catchers that took the Watch-&-Click
test had received training. However, as this study did not use a
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andom sample of catchers we are unable to estimate the extent
o which this reflects the level of training among catchers in Eng-
and and Wales. In 2006, it was estimated that 300–400 catchers
orked in the broiler sector (Gittins and Canning, 2006). This same
eport, prepared for the Department for Environment, Food and
ural Affairs (DEFRA) and the UK FSA, concluded that biosecurity
raining was required for the catching industry. It is not clear if the
igh level of training seen, as part of the study, was in response to
hese recommendations. Additionally, the study was completed in
he implementation period for a new biosecurity training clause in
he Red Tractor standard (Red Tractor Assurance for Farms – Poultry
cheme, 2014). The new clause requires the catching team to be
rained at induction and annually to minimise bird stress at depop-
lation and understand biosecurity issues, with the biosecurity
tandard operating procedure to include reference to Campylobac-
er controls. Despite reported levels of biosecurity training being
igh, it is worth highlighting that many participants in the current
tudy lacked awareness of the Poultry Passport scheme, which pro-
ide a transferable training record for people involved in the poultry
ndustry (www.poultrypassport.org). This suggests that, for many
eople, the training that has been undertaken has not been appro-
riately recorded and/or that the participants did not understand
he role of the Passport.
The results from the Watch-&-Click study indicate that many
f the catchers in the study had a high awareness of the biosecu-
ity measures needed on farms and the ability to identify hazards
hen they are shown to them in real-time, with many partici-
ants successfully identifying all 7 hazards. There was evidence
hat biosecurity training improved hazard identification, with a sig-
ificant effect of training on the ability to successfully identify all
azards (with half of trained participants recognising all hazards,
ompared to less than 10% of untrained participants). Addition-
lly, a training effect was evident for the recognition of two specific
azards (Forklift not sanitised before going onto farm and Boots
ot dipped on entry to the shed). This correlates with the find-
ngs from Millman et al. (2015) which show that individuals with
ood safety training or knowledge are more likely to identify the
azards shown in a clip showing domestic food safety hazards.
he MCA  revealed that the majority of variation in total score was
ttributable to one dimension that was most influenced by identifi-
ation of three hazards ‘Forklift’, ‘Crates’ and ‘Break’. Furthermore,
his dimension was affected by training, which may  suggest that
nformation about these three biosecurity issues is covered more
requently in training. The impact of training on hazard identifi-
ation was also illustrated using HCA, with cluster 1 which had
he highest average score, including most of the people who had
eceived training, compared to the lowest average score for cluster
, which had the lowest proportion who had received training. The
ain cluster groups identified using HCA suggests sub-populations
f catchers that vary in their ability to identify biosecurity hazards
nd in their experience of training.
The hazards that were used in the film footage were chosen to
epresent those listed by assurance schemes, commonly included
n company biosecurity protocols and that may  present a varied
esponse in terms of ease of identification. Unfortunately due to
he length of the film and difficulty in demonstrating (on film) some
isk factors associated with catching (Newell et al., 2011), some risk
actors such as the absence of hand washing were omitted. During
he collection of data it was noted that procedures varied greatly on
he use of gloves and wrist/arm guards (to prevent scratching) and
he point at which hands were washed as set out in the Red Trac-
or Standard (Red Tractor Assurance for Farms – Poultry Scheme,
014). Campylobacter has been identified on the hands of catching
ersonnel(Newell et al., 2011), so this is an area of compliance that
ould warrant investigation. One of the hazards used, ‘Between
heds’, is not usually included in protocols but has been the subjectry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32
of trials at some model farms. It is therefore of interest that this
hazard was identified by a relatively high number of participants
(77%). This may  well be due to the focus of on-farm biosecurity, the
awareness of some biosecurity contradictions (highlighted by indi-
viduals in the interviews), or simply the action of the film following
the forklift providing a ‘clue’.
The Watch-&-Click tool was  developed to provide video footage
of an environment that is familiar to the catchers, reducing the
observer bias that is often evident when individuals are watched
within observational studies (Gill and Johnson, 1997). The use of
video also creates a time pressure for the individual to respond
using fast, automatic responses instead of deliberating the answer.
In turn, it is hoped that the fast responses provided are that of
knowledge and routine. Whilst there is no comparison with a more
traditional survey, the results indicate that levels of knowledge are
high, which was  subsequently substantiated in the interviews.
Surveys have been carried out amongst the poultry farming
community (although mostly in relation to avian flu) to assess the
standards of biosecurity in place (East, 2007; Dorea et al., 2010;
Racicot et al., 2011; Van Steenwinkel et al., 2011; Racicot et al.,
2012; Ssematimba et al., 2013). However, few of these studies have
used observation to evaluate the performance of the biosecurity
practices, and therefore have not assessed compliance to biosecu-
rity protocols. In contrast, Racicot et al. (2011) used video cameras
to record biosecurity protocols in practice. These authors suggest
that the effectiveness of the protocols depends on the consistency
of their application by the farmers and farm workers, citing training
as the key to improved standards.
However, further work by Racicot et al. (2012), also using video
observation of poultry farm workers, found that level of education,
duration of experience and personality traits, influenced compli-
ance with biosecurity protocols. However, the association between
experience and compliance was  complex, with compliance great-
est in those with 5–11 years experience and lowest in those with
less than 5 years, or more than 24 years experience. They argued,
following Park and Jung (2003), that the lower compliance among
less experienced individuals may  be due to a lack of, or ineffective,
training, as people with limited experience rely to a greater extent
on training rather than their own experience. In contrast, com-
pliance among more experienced individuals may be associated
with greater recognition of the consequences of non-compliance
(Park and Jung, 2003). Racicot et al. (2012) also suggested that
the increased compliance among workers with 5–11 years expe-
rience may  be due, in particular, to the highly pathogenic avian
influenza outbreak in 2004 in British Columbia, which led to a range
of biosecurity initiatives. Hence, the relationship between training,
experience and compliance is likely to be complex and vary with
situation. As the study was not able to determine the detail of train-
ing conducted with the catchers, only the reported completion, it is
unclear to what extent individuals received training on the princi-
ples and need for biosecurity versus the procedures. Nevertheless,
these findings provide a point of departure for consideration of the
distinction between formal and on-the-job training noted by par-
ticipants in the current study and suggest this issue requires further
investigation.
In the current study, whilst some individuals questioned the
value of training, overwhelmingly the catchers knew many of the
recommended biosecurity procedures, as evidenced by both the
high scores on the Watch-&-Click survey and in the discussions dur-
ing the interviews, suggesting that biosecurity training was more
effective than realised by the catchers. However, the current study
found that biosecurity protocols are often not followed even where
knowledge is present. Hence, the key new insight from our study is
that deviation from recognised procedures and protocols (i.e. lack
of compliance), rather than being due to ignorance, is often a con-
scious decision to modify biosecurity practices in order to meet the
terina
d
s
u
e
t
t
t
e
f
r
g
a
o
c
i
o
o
m
r
d
t
b
t
t
p
e
s
i
w
i
p
d
r
(
p
f
5
t
o
t
w
W
b
e
b
a
t
t
(
s
r
o
C
r
b
e
sC. Millman et al. / Preventive Ve
emands of the job, within the practical and organisational con-
traints in which they operate, and were therefore usually seen as
navoidable compromises. Furthermore, the catchers’ and farm-
rs’ experience of the messy and complex nature of catching made
hem question the value of rigid performance of biosecurity pro-
ocols, which contribute to a lack of motivation to comply with
hese. These findings build on those of others who report that, for
xample, cattle and sheep farmers lack of faith in the efficacy of
arm-level biosecurity and concern that improved biosecurity will
educe autonomy (Gunn et al., 2008), that sheep and pig farmers
enerally feel that are doing all they can to minimise disease risk
nd that those practices not implemented are either not relevant
r ineffective (Garforth et al., 2013). Catchers were well aware of
ontradictions between biosecurity procedures and the practical-
ties that arose due, for example, to the planning and scheduling
f delivery of birds to the factories alongside additional agriculture
perations to achieve that, including cleaning and farm manage-
ent. For example, repeated thinning of sheds (as opposed to the
ecommended single thinning) and scheduling of thinning after
epopulation of another farm (again, contrary to recommenda-
ions) were recognised by catchers and farmers as poor practise and
reaches of companies’ own biosecurity protocols. These contradic-
ions led catchers and farmers to openly question the protocols and
he need for their own compliance with these.
Thus, rather than nonconformity with standardised biosecurity
rotocols being seen indicative of poor work practice amenable to
ducation or enforcement, it was viewed by the catchers them-
elves as evidence of their resourcefulness and strong work ethic
n the face of adverse conditions. These findings are in keeping with
hat Timmermans and Berg (1997) call ‘local universality’, which
s the idea that standardised practices (such as are prescribed in
rotocols) can only be universal (i.e. work in different places and at
ifferent times) if they are locally adapted. We  suggest that, whilst
eduction or removal of the constraints to fulfilling the protocol
such as provision of extra time and equipment) may  improve com-
liance, emphasis only on training and/or coercion is unlikely to be
ully successful.
. Conclusion
This study reveals that a lack of knowledge is unlikely to be
he sole, or even the main, factor behind an apparent failure to
f catchers comply with biosecurity protocols in poultry produc-
ion systems in the UK. Many of the catchers included in this study
ere able to identify most or all of the hazards included in the
atch-&-Click survey. Furthermore, quite detailed knowledge of
iosecurity protocols was often revealed during interviews. How-
ver, an important conclusion from this study is that (what might
e considered to be) failure to comply with recognised procedures
nd protocols was usually reported by the catchers themselves as
he result of deliberate or unavoidable action taken in order to meet
he demands of the job.
In our view, catchers find themselves in something of a catch-22
Heller, 1961) in which mutually conflicting circumstances prevent
imultaneous completion of their job and compliance with biosecu-
ity standards. Hence, although education about, and enforcement
f, biosecurity protocols has been recommended (Gittins and
anning, 2006; Allen et al., 2008), our findings suggest that further
eforms, including changing the context in which catching occurs
y improving the equipment and other resources available to catch-
rs and providing more time for biosecurity, may  be essential for
uccessful implementation of existing protocols.ry Medicine 141 (2017) 22–32 31
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